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Abstract
Literature on bargaining within international organizations points
to two potential sources of bargaining power: veto rights and exit
rights. In some circumstances a member state may be able to veto a
rules change which it opposes. In others, it may be able to threaten
to leave the organization if its demands are not met. Finally, if exit
from the organization is possible, other member states may be able to
force a laggard member state to accept changes it opposes by threat-
ening to kick the laggard out of the organization if the state does
not agree to the proposed change. Under what circumstances do veto
rights provide bargaining leverage and under what circumstances are
exit threats a source of power? When would a member state prefer to
use one of these sources of power over the other? Are both of these
options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean
that the other is not? What implications does this have for politi-
cal integration, and more broadly, the possible creation of a federal
state? This paper seeks to answer these questions using a game the-
oretic model to examine the interaction between veto rights and exit
threats in international organizations and federal states. My model
has implications for European integration and can also help explain
the conditions under which independent states give up sovereignty
to form a stable federal union. I test the implications of the model
through a case study of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s.
11 Introduction
Following the February 1974 British election, Harold Wilson became
the ﬁrst Labour prime minister since the UK joined the European
Community (EC) on 1 January 1973.1 Upon taking oﬃce, he im-
mediately demanded the EC renegotiate British terms of entry, and
threatened to leave the organization if his demands were not met.
Labour’s election manifesto went so far as to state,“If re-negotiations
do not succeed, we shall not regard the Treaty obligations as binding
upon us.”2 After months of negotiations, Wilson declared he had won
signiﬁcant concessions from the other member states and urged voters
to support a referendum 1975 referendum on EC membership.
Several years later, when the Conservatives came to power, Mar-
garet Thatcher used a very diﬀerent bargaining tactic to extract a
budget rebate from the EC. She did not threaten to exit the EC, but
instead she threatened to stall legislation by invoking the UK’s veto
right if the UK did not receive the budget rebate she demanded.3 In
the end the tactic was eﬀective. The obstructionist British strategy
secured them a two-thirds budget rebate.4 The diﬀerent bargaining
tactics employed by these two British prime ministers highlight an
interesting puzzle. Under what circumstances does the right to a veto
1At the time the European Union was called the European Community. It adopted its
current name with the 1992 Treaty on European Union
2Labour Manifesto, February 1974, available at
http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab74feb.htm
3See “How to be thoroughly obnoxious.” The Economist, November 10, 1979, p60.
4See “Britain’s veto fades away .” The Financial Times July 2, 1984, p17.
2provide bargaining leverage and under what circumstances are exit
threats a source of power when negotiating within an international
organization or federal state? When would a member state prefer to
use one of these sources of power over the other? Are both of these
options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean
that the other is not? What implications does this have for European
integration, and more broadly, the creation of a stable federal state?
This paper seeks to answer these questions using a game theo-
retic model to examine the interaction between veto rights and exit
threats in international organizations and federal states. My model
has implications for EU integration and can also help explain the con-
ditions under which independent states give up sovereignty to form a
stable federal state. Finally, it examines whether the ability to exit
an organization is a source of bargaining power, as some international
relations literature tends to suggest, or whether sometimes this may,
in fact, be a liability.
The essense of my game is as follows. Two states come together to
negotiate the rules of an international organization or a federal state.
They may be creating a new organization or renegotiating the rules
of an existing regime. One state prefers deeper integration while the
second is a laggard who prefers very little change from the status quo-
no integration. There are two types of organizations they can form.
The ﬁrst type of organization provides the laggard state with an exit
option, whereby it can leave the organization if it feels its partner is
3pushing integration too far. In the second type of organization, exit
is not possible, but the laggard can veto proposals made by its part-
ner whenever it prefers the status quo. The ﬁrst type of organization
is similar to an international organization or perhaps a weak federal
state, while the second type of organization more closely mirrors a
stable federal state. In this framework, a stable federal state is an
organization where exit by members is virtually inconceivable but ve-
toes are likely. I ﬁnd that whether states opt for the federal style veto
regime over a regime where exit is possible depends upon the states’
costs associated with the laggard state leaving the regime as well as
the likelihood that the state prefering integration believes that some-
time in the future it may prefer to retain the right to veto a proposal
it does not like. Moreover, I ﬁnd that exit rights are not always a
source of bargaining power for laggard states. Sometimes the mere
existence of an exit option can provide the state desiring integration
with a great deal of bargaining leverage.
The paper will proceed by ﬁrst introducing the current literature
on exit threats and veto power in international organizations and fed-
eral systems. I will pay particular attention to how literature has
examined European integration. Second I will introduce my game
and examine the conditions under which states are likely to make
exit threats, exercise veto rights, and move from an international to
federal regime. I then will examine how these ﬁndings apply to EU
integration, and ﬁnally I will conclude.
42 Bargaining Power and the Creation
of International Organizations
International relations literature has long considered how and why
states form international organizations. Within this subﬁeld the de-
bate has focused on two related questions: Do international organi-
zations matter and which states are most powerful when designing
them? Answers to these questions have been shaped by two domi-
nant traditions, realism and liberal-institutionalism. Realists argue
that international politics is primarily driven by power politics and
relations between states, making international organizations largely
irrelevant (Waltz 1979, Grieco 1988). Liberal-Institutionalists, on the
other hand, argue that under certain conditions states can design in-
ternational organizations to help them realize utility gains they could
not otherwise achieve (Axelrod 1984, Keohane 1984, Oye 1986). Gru-
ber (2000), however, argues that there is a general consensus between
the realist and liberal-institutionalist traditions that international or-
ganizations, regardless of their relevance to world politics, only arise
when they make all states better oﬀ compared to the status quo. The
debate takes for granted that international organizations may arise if
they are in the best interests of all participants, and the more inter-
esting question becomes which states get to draft the rules. Krasner
(1991) argues, for example, that while there are many possible pareto
improving equilibria when designing international regimes, the most
5powerful states are able to select from these the equilibrium which
suits them best.
Gruber, however, counters that the underlying assumption that
international organizations are pareto improving for all need not be
true. For some states, participation in an international organization
may be a necessary evil. These states would be better oﬀ if the orga-
nization did not exist, but given that it does, they feel it is necessary
for them to participate. In other words, the organization is designed
in such a way that the costs to laggard states for not participating are
too high, even though these states preferred the original status quo of
no international organization at all.
This work begins to examine the costs associated withexiting from,
or not participating in, an international organization. However, Gru-
ber’s approach lumps together two types of costs, which I argue are
best disentangled. First, a state may suﬀer a utility loss by accepting
a policy dictated by the international organization that is not identi-
cal to its own ideal point. The assumption is that if a state were to
go it alone, it would be able to implement its own policy ideal point
unencumbered by other states. Second, there may be additional repu-
tationalcosts associated with not participatingin the organization, or,
conversely, reputational beneﬁts for participating. For example, other
states, ﬁnancial markets, and international ﬁrms may shun a country
for not joining an international organization they deem “good”. Like-
wise, joining a highly regarded international organization may confer
6some reputational beneﬁt on states, regardless of how these states feel
about the organization’s policy, which they would not receive if they
did not join the organization (Gray 2006). Finally, if some domestic
interests prefer to participate in the organization, there may be audi-
ence costs for a state which decides not to participate. For Gruber,
both types of costs are collapsed onto a single dimension.
Studies of European integration have examined the eﬀects of lag-
gard states on intergovernmental bargaining, and some literature has
pointed to a laggard’s credible threat to exit the European Union as
a source of bargaining power (Schneider & Cederman 1994). This,
of course, assumes that the laggard’s cost associated with exiting is
low enough that their exit threat is credible. Member states desiring
the laggard’s participation in the EU are forced to cede to the lag-
gard’s demands or they risk the laggard walking away from the EU.
This was possibly true of the UK in the 1970s. However, today the
likelihood that any member state would fully exit the EU is very low
(Kelemen 2007). Even though some may complain at times about
monetary union or other aspects of the EU, it is highly unlikely that
any current members could credibly threaten to exit the EU. More-
over, it is not clear that an exit option is always a source of power. It
may not always be the case that a laggard has a low cost associated
exit. Instead, as Gruber (2000) has suggested, the costs to exiting an
organization (or not joining to begin with) may be very real, and may
7actually put the laggard at a disadvantage.5 Schneider & Cederman
(1994) suggest that while making an exit threat may have provided
Britain with bargaining leverage in 1974, it did not in 1978 while nego-
tiating the establishment of the Economic Monetary System (EMS).
In Schneider and Cederman’s model, this is because Britian could not
credibly commit to exiting in 1978, while in they could in 1974. In
1978, the Germans and the French called Britain’s bluﬀ and countered
that they would exclude Britain from the new regime unless Britain
backed down. The same dynamic occurred when negotiating the Sin-
gle European Act (SEA). Thatcher was forced to accept the German
and French position with regard to majority voting in the Council for
the internal market when France and Germany threatened to exclude
the UK from the treaty if she did not (Schneider & Cederman 1994,
639). Here, the possibility of exit from the regime actually weakened
the UK’s bargaining position.
Recent empirical literature on constitutional bargaining in Europe
points to a second source of power for laggard states: veto power (Hug
& Koenig 2002, Koenig & Slapin 2006, Slapin 2006, Slapin 2008).
These studies ﬁnd that states close to the status quo tend to get
what they want when negotiating EU treaties. Moreover, states with
domestic ratiﬁcation pivots close to the status quo have more bargain-
ing power(Hug & Koenig 2002, Slapin 2006). Because all states must
ratify any major institutional changes made through an intergovern-
5See also Schimmelfennig (2001) for ways this argument can be applied to member
states’ acceptance of EU enlargement.
8mental conference, laggard states can threaten to veto treaties which
make them worse oﬀ compared to the status quo. Even without an
exit option, laggards are powerful because they can prevent change.
However, for veto rights to provide power to laggard states, states pre-
ferring integrationmust either really desire the laggard’sparticipation,
or exit cannot be a legitimate option. If exit were a legitimate option
and states preferring integration did not care about the laggard’s par-
ticipation, they could simply exclude the laggard from negotiations if
the laggard threatened to veto proposed changes. This suggests an
interaction between the possibility of exit and veto rights when de-
termining member state bargaining power, and it is this interaction
which this paper will more closely explore.
3 Federal Bargaining
Internationalrelations is not the only literature to examine veto rights,
exit strategies, and bargaining between states. Literature examining
federalism in the US and comparative context also addresses these
sources of power to draw conclusions about the nature and design fed-
eral institutions. Federalism literature often explores the conditions
under which federal systems are stable. In other words, what pre-
vents member states from leaving a union of federal states? There are
generally two answers, both of which are similar to the answers posed
above by the international relations literature. The ﬁrst is the cost as-
sociated with exit from the union. If the costs associated with exiting
9a federal union are too high, member states will not leave. Filippov,
Ordeshook & Shvetsova (2004) cite the example of the breakup of the
Soviet Union in the late 1990’s. Soviet leaders attempted to convince
the Baltic countries that they would be much better oﬀ under the new
Soviet system than they would be if they left the union. Of course,
in this case the costs of exit were not high enough to keep the Baltic
countries in the union.
A second mechanism to keep member states from exiting a federal
union is to guarantee them that their interests will be heard within
the union through democratic political insitutions (Bednar, Eskridge
& Ferejohn 2001). This is accomplished by designing strong federal
institutions, such as upper chambers which represent states interests,
and unbiased courts which can adjudicate interstate disputes. In the
EU, both of these features already exist, and help to ensure the EU’s
stability (Kelemen 2007).
In addition, the empirical work on bargaining at the EU’s treaty
negotiationssuggests another possible safeguard availableto EU mem-
ber states, and perhaps states in other federal organizations as well.
Because all member states must agree to major institutional changes
made at treaty negotiations, laggards can always veto a major treaty
change which they believe pushes integration too far. This also ex-
plains why constitutional change in other federal systems, such as the
US, require high super majorities. Even laggard States are given a
powerful voice when determining major constitutional changes.
104 The Exit-Veto Game
The literatureson internationalorganizations,federalism and EU inte-
gration present several hypotheses about when and why laggard states
should have power when negotiating the rules of the federal regime or
international organizaiton. Under some conditions, exit threats may
provide laggards with bargaining leverage, but in other scenarios veto
rights may help protect laggards’ interests. However, veto rights and
exit options may work against with one another. If exiting an orga-
nization is a realistic possibility for a laggard state, this may render
veto threats meaningless depending upon the costs associated with a
member state leaving the organization. I attempt to sort out the ef-
fects of two of these potential sources of power using a game-theoretic
model. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate how these potential power
sources relate to the design of international organizations, stability of
federal states, and EU integration.
2 ∗| L − SQ| < |I − SQ|
Status Quo
0
LI Integration
1
Figure 1: A Spatial Model of Integration
The basis of my game is a spatial model, depicted in ﬁgure 1. Two
states have Euclidean preferences in a uni-dimensional space repre-
sentng integration. In this space, zero represents no integration and
11one represents maximal integration. The state, L, is a laggard has a
preference relatively close to the status quo, while the state I takes
a position in favor of further integration. Even the laggard, however,
prefers a little integration. In other words, L ≥ SQ. In addition, I
deﬁne a laggard so that 2 ∗| L − SQ| < |I − SQ|. This means that if
the laggard has veto power, the state prefering integration can never
receive her own ideal point. Under a veto regime, both actors are able
to veto any proposal which makes them worse oﬀ compared to the
status quo. I assume actor I is the agenda setter, and is thus able to
make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to L. This means that in the veto
game, the outcome will be 2∗|L−SQ|, which simpliﬁes to 2L because
the status quo is located at zero and L and I are both located to the
right of the status quo. The payoﬀ to the laggard, L, for this game is
−L and the payoﬀ to the state prefering integration, I,i s−|I − 2L|.
4.1 The extensive form game
Keeping this spatial framework in mind, I now explain my extensive
form game found in ﬁgure 2. The state preferring integration is player
1, and she has the ﬁrst move. She can choose to either oﬀer the laggard
state participation in a veto regime, under which the laggard state is
granted veto rights in this round of negotiations as well as in every
future round. Under this veto regime, exit from the organization is
never possible. This is akin to creating a stable federal state. If player
1 chooses the veto regimeroute, player2, the laggard,can either accept
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Figure 2: The Exit-Veto Game
1
3player 1’s oﬀer to create a stable federal regime where each player has
veto rights, or he can leave the organization. If player 2 accepts the
veto regime, the outcome of the game mirrors the veto game from
spatial model above: 2L. The payoﬀs are then −|I − 2L|−δ1z1 for
player 1 and −L − δ2z2 for player 2. The ﬁrst part of the payoﬀ are
the payoﬀs from the spatial game. δ is a discount factor representing
the importance of the future to each player and can range between 0
and 1, where 0 implies that the state does not care about the future
at all and 1 means the player weighs the future just as much as the
present. Players’ beliefs about the future relationship between their
preferences is captured by z.I f z is negative, this implies that the
player believe they are likely to switch places with the other player.
In other words, the actor preferring integrationbelieves that sometime
in the future on some issues it could become a laggard and want to
protect the status quo by retaining veto capabilities.
Player 2 does not have to enter into this stable federal system. If
player 2 does not accept player 1’s oﬀer to participate in a veto regime,
player 2 can walk away from the organization. In this case, both play-
ers can implement their own ideal points in the spatial game, making
their ideological loss 0. However, they each pay a non-ideological cost,
C1 and C2, associated with the laggard’s exit from the talks. These
can be viewed as reputational or audience costs suﬀerred because they
decided not to create the organization.
Player 1 can also choose a hegemon regime by oﬀering her own
14ideal point to the laggard. Under this regime, future exit from the
organization is possible and player 2 is not always guaranteed a veto.
The laggard then has two options: he can either accept the oﬀer of
player 1 or he can demand a veto. If he accepts player 1’s oﬀer,
the outcome the game is the creation of an international organization
at player 1’s ideal point, I. The playoﬀs are 0 for player 1 because
she receives her ideal point and −|I − L| for player 2, the distance
between his ideal point and the outcome of the game, I. If player 2
demands a veto, player 1 can either back down and oﬀer a veto for
this round of play only, or she can stand ﬁrm. In either case, player 2
can then decide whether to accept the proposed arrangement or exit
the organization. If player 1 backs down and oﬀers a veto to player 2,
and player 2 accepts, the payoﬀs are the outcome of the veto game,
−|I−L| for player 1 and −L for player 2. There are no costs associated
with the future because the veto is oﬀered for the current round of
negotiations only. If player 1, on the other hand, stands ﬁrm and
player 2 accepts, the payoﬀs are 0 for player 1 and −|I −L| for player
2. If player 2 decides to exit the organization, the payoﬀs are always
−C1 and −C2
4.2 Equilibrium concepts and solutions
I solve the game using a subgame perfect equilibrium concept and I
assume complete information. This means both players know each
other’s ideal points and the non-ideological costs associated with the
15laggard’s exit. Future work could relax this assumption by assuming
that the players have full knowledge of each other’s ideal points but
they only know their own cost associated with the laggard’s exit. This
would then require me to use a perfect bayesian equilbrium concept to
solve the game. However, even assuming full information, this game
provides several interesting ﬁndings which I explore here.
I begin by exploring which parameter values would lead the per-
manent veto game to occur in equilibrium. In other words, under
what conditions do we expect a stable federal system to arise under
which exit is not an option? First, assume that the laggard prefers
to exit the organization if not oﬀered a veto, but would remain in the
organization if provided a veto. In addition, player 1 has a very high
non-spatial cost (C1) associated with player 2’s exit. This means that
at the end nodes of the hegemon game, player 2 will exit if player 1
has decided to stand ﬁrm, but will remain in the organization and
accept the veto game outcome if player 1 decides to backdown. Player
1 knows this and must decide whether to stand ﬁrm or back down.
Because player 1 really does not want player 2 to exit (C1 is very
high), player 1 will back down. Player 2 will therefore demand a veto
if player 1 chooses to play the hegemon game. If, on the other hand,
player 1 had opted for the veto game at the ﬁrst node, player 2 would
have to choose again whether to exit the organization or accept partic-
ipation in a stable veto regime. Assuming that player 2 discounts the
future fairly heavily (δ2 is close to zero) or that playing the veto game
16would be fairly good for player 2 in the long run (z2 is small), player
2 will choose to accept player 1’s oﬀer to participate in a permanent
veto regime if given the chance. This leaves player 1 with a choice:
either play the hegemon game realizing that player 2 will demand and
succeed in securing a veto, but only for this one interaction, or opt to
give player 2 a permanent veto. Player 1 will choose to oﬀer player 2
participation in a permanent veto regime under two conditions. First,
player 1 totally discounts the future (δ1 is zero), in which case player 1
is indiﬀerent between playing the veto game and playing the hegemon
game. Second, player 1 believes that at some point in the future she
may become the laggard on some issue and wish to have guaranteed
veto power (z1 is negative because the positions of the actors are re-
versed). In other words, by opting for the veto regime, player 1 has
a hedge against future uncertainty. She never knows when she may
need veto power, herself.
The players would also land in the permanent veto game equilib-
rium if player 2 always prefers to exit when in the hegemon game,
but, if given the opportunity to take part a in permanent veto regime,
would accept the oﬀer. This implies that z2 is negative. This could
happen if player 2 believes that without the security of the perma-
nent veto, player 1 may be able to extract future concessions from
him. This could potentially happen if player 2 expects to face very
high costs associated with exiting the organization in the future. I
will demonstrate why this is true below. When this is true, player 2
17will always demand a veto in the hegemon game, and player 1 will
be indiﬀerent between standing ﬁrm and backing down because both
will result in 2’s exit. As long as player 1 prefers player 2’s participa-
tion in the regime over his exit, she will oﬀer him participation in the
permanent veto game, and he will accept.
There are two important things to notice about these equilibria.
First, in order to end up in the permanent veto regime equilibrium,
player 2, the laggard, must have relatively low costs associated with
exit, but they cannot be too low. If exit is costless, player 2 will always
exit the regime. However, if player 2’s costs associated with exit are
too high, he will always accept player 1’s oﬀer even if she only oﬀers
him her own ideal point. She therefore has no incentive to oﬀer him
participation in a permanent veto regime. Likewise, player 1 must
have relatively high costs associated with player 2’s exit. She must
prefer to keep him in the regime if she is able. Otherwise, it would be
best for her simply to let him walk away.
This leads me to another equilibrium worth exploring. Under what
circumstances does the ability to exit an organization actually hurt
rather than help a laggard? Although much literature treats an exit
option as a potential source of power, this is not always the case. As
Schneider & Cederman (1994) suggest, exit threats are only a source
of power when the threat is credible. Understanding this equilibrium
will help us understand the scenario mentioned above where player 1
would always exit the regime in the hegemon game, but if oﬀered a
18permanent veto, would accept participation in the organization. This
occurs whenever the laggard’s exit is costly for the laggard (C2 is
high) but not costly for player 1 (C1 is low). When this is true,
player 2 will accept participation in any regime rather than exiting
the organization at all end nodes. In the hegemon game, player 1 will
stand ﬁrm if player 2 demands a veto, knowing that he will not exit.
Player 2, then, will accept player 1’s original oﬀer to participate in an
hegemon regime where the outcome is player 1’s ideal point. Player
1 has no incentive to oﬀer player 2 participation in a permanent veto
game because she can do better if she demands her own ideal point
and does not grant player 2 a veto in the hegemon game. This would
mirror the scenario where a large and powerful state oﬀers a small
laggard state participation in a regime under her terms, and says the
laggard must accept her integrationalist terms or walk.
5 Discussion: Negotiating The British
Budget Rebate
To demonstrate how this game leads to new insights on bargaining in
the EU and other federal systems, I come back to one of the examples
mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the British budget rebate.
I reanalyze the negotiations behind the British budget rebate with
respect to the equilibrium outcomes discussed above. In light of the
game, these negotiations present a puzzle. Why did other member
19states eventually cave to Thatcher’s obstructionist threats, granting
the UK a 66% budget rebate at the 1984 European Council meeting
in Fountainebleu, rather than seek other methods for dealing with the
UK’s obstinacy? One such method mentioned at the time was to go
forward with a two-speed Europe.6 In other words, member states
could have designed rules essentially leaving the UK on the sideline
with no recourse to a veto, an outcome akin to excluding the UK
from the union. Why was caving to the UK’s position and granting
the UK a veto a more attractive option for the remaining member
states than this two-speed approach? How might this have aﬀected
EU integration in the long term?
My game suggests a possible answer to these questions. First,
member states may have been willing to deal with Thatcher and even-
tually grant her demands because these states looked into the future
and saw that there were major institutional issues on the table over
which they might want to have a veto. One such issue for Germany
might have been monetary union, while for France, it might have been
negotiations over the Common Agriculture Policy coupled with south-
ern enlargement to Greece, Portugal and Spain.
In 1979, when Margaret Thatcher came to power in the UK, she
was at ﬁrst viewed as more favorable towards Europe than her Labour
predecessors. A Conservative government had been in power when
6See “Mitterrand Urges Western Europe To Strengthen Political Integration; Britain
Is Warned Against Failing to Cooperate With Community.” The Washington Post May
24, 1984, pA25.
20the UK ﬁrst joined the EC, and during the mid-70s, while Labour was
threatening to leave the EC, Thatcher, the new opposition leader,
made clear the Tories support for Europe (Dinan 1999, 88).7 Never-
theless, Thatcher was clearly not willing to accept Europe at all costs,
and was very wary of supranational attempts to limit national author-
ity. In terms of the above game, she had fairly high costs associated
with exiting the EC, but they were not exorbitantly high, one of the
conditions for a stable veto regime equilibrium to emerge.
Thatcher viewed the UK’s budgetary obligations to the EC as a
major injustice left behind in the wake of Labour’s 1975 renegotiation
of EC entry. In her mind, the UK paid too much and received too
little. Moreover, because of a transitional agreement, the size of the
UK’s budget contribution became more apparent at the end of the
1970’s when Thatcher took oﬃce (Dinan 1999, 89). Thatcher’s bar-
gaining tacit was to block the EC’s business until the other member
states caved to her wishes. However, rather than allow Thatcher to
block business, the other member states had another option, as my
game suggests. They could have simply opted to exclude the UK from
the EC. This is, in essence, what a two-speed approach would have
accomplished. France, Germany, and the other member states, how-
ever, did not use this option. Instead, they caved to Thatcher’s wishes
granting her a 66% rebate. In my game, this suggests that they landed
at the permanent veto regime equilibrium. The member states favor-
7See also ”A Gin for Europe.” The Economist April 19, 1975, p40.
21ing EU integration oﬀered the UK participation in a veto regime, and
UK accepted this arrangement by accepting the negotiated rebate.
For this to be an equilibrium outcome, the states preferring inte-
gration would have had to believe that in the future they might have
reason to want veto power. At the time there was good reason for
both Germany and France to want a recourse a veto over major in-
stitutional decisions. First, throughout this period, talk of monetary
union was well underway. On this issue, Germany, and speciﬁcally the
German Bundesbank, wanted to protect Germany’s solid ﬁscal policy
against the EC’s economic laggards facing higher inﬂation such as
Britian, France, and Italy (Moravcsik 1998). France, on the other
hand, may have wanted to maintain a strong hand preserving its agri-
cultural subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy. This was a
particularly divisive subject given the upcoming expansion of the EC
to Greece, Spain and Portugal, three poor countries with large agri-
cultural sectors which would compete directly with French farmers.
Throughout accession negotiations, France was skeptical of admitting
these countries, especially Spain, largely because of agricultural con-
cerns. Enlargement could only proceed after foreign ministers had
agreed to a ﬁve year deal on structural aid to farmers linked to en-
largement (Dinan 1999, 108).
This case study demonstrates how my game accurately captures
bargaining in the EU. Moreover, it suggests that one of the EU’s
darkest hours, the early 1980’s when many pundits were discussing
22the EU’s demise, may have been the point at which the EU began to
function like a more stable federal system, where exit from the organi-
zation became increasingly unlikely, and instead member states used
veto power to block major institutional changes which they opposed.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the interactive eﬀects of veto rights and exit
options in the design of international organizations and federal states.
I build the work of Gruber (2000) and Schneider & Cederman (1994),
who examine exit threats, the costs associated with exit from inter-
national regimes, and how this inﬂuences bargaining power within
international organizations. However, I go beyond these models by
incorporating veto power into my model. In addition, I treat ideo-
logical costs associated with policy implementation as distinct from
reputational costs associated with exiting an organization. My model
demonstrates that eﬀects of veto rights and exit options are inter-
twined and must be considered together when examining state bar-
gaining power. Having an exit option is not always as source of power
for laggard states because if laggards have high costs associated with
exiting an organizations, states prefering integration may exploit this
fact. They can extract concessions from the laggards, making them
worse oﬀ than they would be if the status quo remained intact. The
model also highlights when stable organizations are likely to arise. An
interesting implication of the model is that this depends largely on
23the beliefs of the actors about the future. A stable regime is more
likely to develop when a state currently prefering integration believes
it could potentially become a laggard in the future. It is more likely
to opt to create a stable, federal-style regime with veto safeguards if
it believes that it might need a guaranteed veto right to protect its
interests in the future.
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